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Abstract  
In recent years climate change has become integrated into pre-existing, but fragmented 
structures of global security governance. In this article I argue that while institutional 
fragmentation of global climate security governance is not automatically problematic the 
phenomenon of ideational fragmentation that often goes with it is highly disadvantageous to 
achieving climate security for people. This is because the preferences of a diverse group of 
security organisations/actors (in this article the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union and the United 
States/Pentagon) are often vastly removed from the global agenda set by the United Nations 
and their expressed preference for understanding climate security in terms of human security. 
I suggest that the first step towards overcoming ideational fragmentation would have to be the 
advancement of a universal definition of climate security by an authoritative source, however, 
given that security is for many actors a matter of perception the chances of overcoming 
ideational fragmentation are slim. 
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Introduction  
Since publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) fourth 
assessment report in 2007 climate change is widely believed to be a serious threat to most of 
the world’s ecosystems and even to civilisation. An array of politicians, non-governmental 
organisations and academics alike, have declared that climate change is now such a serious 
issue that it is a threat to human, national or international security. By contrast I argue in this 
article that the “securitisation” of climate change is not an invariably good development, 
because it does not necessarily equate to a securer climate for people. This assertion has been 
made before by scholars who have examined conflicting discursive constructions of climate 
security.1 While such work is important, a focus on competing discourses does not explain 
why different security organisations/actors are likely to focus on one discourse over another. 
In order to uncover this I pursue a different line of enquiry and examine climate security 
through the lens of global governance. I argue that a focus on a twofold fragmentation of 
global climate security governance into institutional and ideational fragmentation allows me 
to uncover the reasons for why diverse actors are likely to adopt distinct frames of climate 
security. The evident and –in all likelihood- insurmountable ideational split coupled with the 
fact that not all interpretations of climate security lead to a safer climate for people form the 
basis for my critique of the securitisation of climate change. 
  Although increasingly popular2 the term global governance evades exact definition. In 
the academic study of environmental politics it can refer either to high degrees of 
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institutionalisation, which is to say regimes operating at the global level3, or more loosely to 
the totality of norms, regimes, principles and values dealing with one global environmental 
issue involving multiple actors.4 Although the looser definition already highlights that 
different actors are likely to have diverse views on how any given global environmental issue 
ought to be addressed the relevant literature tends to recognise institutional fragmentation 
only5, when we are in fact dealing with a two-fold fragmentation of global environmental 
governance consisting of institutional fragmentation and ideational fragmentation. 
Institutional fragmentation refers to the phenomenon that a multitude of different actors are 
engaged in the provision of global environmental governance, while the concept of ideational 
fragmentation captures the observation that an actor’s identity, especially the actor’s relative 
strengths and weaknesses are likely to influence how they conceive of an issue. In this article 
I utilise this two-fold fragmentation to problematise global climate security governance. In a 
nutshell I am able to demonstrate that while institutional fragmentation of global climate 
security governance is not automatically problematic the phenomenon of ideational 
fragmentation is highly disadvantageous to achieving climate security for people.6 This is 
because the preferences of a diverse group of security organisations/actors (in this article the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, the European Union and the United States/Pentagon) are often vastly removed 
from the global agenda set by the United Nations and their expressed preference for 
understanding climate security in terms of human security.  
 My argument proceeds as follows. I begin with a discussion of three different frames 
of climate security, including the case for understanding climate security as human security; 
this is followed by an examination of global climate security governance, specifically I locate 
the different climate security frames/discourses within the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the EU, 
and the US/Pentagon respectively. In a third section I critically evaluate institutional and 
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ideational fragmentation. On this basis I argue in the conclusion against the securitisation of 
climate change.  
 Before any of this, however, a word on the selection of security actors/organisations 
featured in this article. Although non-governmental organisations and think-tanks are also 
active in the area of climate security, they are not separately examined here because, other 
than influencing official policy, they remain for now at the margins of climate security 
practice. Furthermore, I am conscious of the fact that –with the exception of the UN- all 
security actors examined are located in the global north, yet climate change is expected to 
affect the global south most acutely. Indeed a host of natural disasters in South East Asia and 
desertification in Africa are already attributed to a changing climate.7 This raises the question 
why not include the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) into this study?  The answer is that neither organisation has successfully 
securitised climate change,8 which –at a minimum- would involve rhetorical recognition of 
climate change as a threat as well as action taken to address the threat (cf. below). Climate 
change is featured on the AU’s agenda only since 2009, when in the run-up to COP15 in 
Copenhagen the newly established Committee of the African Heads of State and Government 
on Climate Change put forward Africa’s common position on climate change. This position 
has since been developed by the Climate Change and Desertification Unit (CCDU) situated 
within the AU’s Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture. CCDU regards climate 
change as ‘the defining development challenge of our time’.9  The biggest concern for the 
CCDU and by the extension the AU clearly is the injustice of the fact that Africa has done 
virtually nothing to contribute to the creation of this ‘menacing global threat’ (climate change 
is referred to as ‘the climate externality’), but faces the brunt of its devastating 
consequences.10 The objective of the common climate strategy is to put this right. In practice 
this means that they are calling on the developed world to a) support a new climate change 
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regime and b) to financially facilitate adaptation and mitigation initiatives in Africa, Africa 
itself as a non-guilty party can do little and therefore does little about climate change.  
 Other bodies within the AU also do not securitise climate change. In spite of the 
expectation by many conflict scholars that Africa will suffer the majority of all climate 
conflicts/wars, AU’s Department for Peace and Security in charge of ‘ending conflict and 
sustaining peace’11 makes no reference to climate change. With some trepidation I suggest 
that one possible explanation for this absence might be that the PSC is dealing with so many 
acute and ongoing conflicts in the region that it has neither the time nor –if one is to believe 
David Campbell’s discourses of danger thesis, whereby security actors actively pursue threat 
narratives to ensure their own relevance into the future-12 the need to worry about potential 
future triggers of conflict.  
 ASEAN is generally more aware of the importance of an intact natural environment 
than the AU. The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community contains a Ministerial Meeting on 
Environment (AMME); the heads of governments have repeatedly stressed their commitment 
to a new UNFCCC global binding carbon regime13; ASEAN has put forward a Joint 
Declaration on Sustainable Development (JDSD) in 2007 and in 2012 an ASEAN Action 
plan on Joint Response to Climate Change (JRCC). Action on climate change in these terms 
has been reaffirmed most recently in the 2014 annual foreign ministers’ meeting (AMM) in 
their joint communiqué.14 Even so the issue is not securitised. In the JDSD climate change is 
mentioned only in passing, while the main causes of unsuitability are more local concerns 
such as the impact of population growth, associated habitant loss, pollution, urbanisation and 
energy provision.15 The JRCC, in turn, strikes a cautious note when it declares that ‘climate 
change in the region may have adverse impacts on livelihoods and communities’, and goes on 
to lay out areas for cooperation between member states that aim to foster both adaptation and 
mitigation.16  
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 ASEAN’s Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) situated in ASEAN’s Political and 
Security Community pillar now increasingly make reference to non-traditional security 
threats, however, it is not specified what these actually are. Climate change is certainly not 
singled out as such a threat. Noteworthy is perhaps that ADMM Three-Year-Work 
Programme 2014-2016 seeks to increase action on military-to-military cooperation on trans-
boundary security issues17. This suggests that they foresee a role for the military on 
environmental issues which could give way to a climate security strategy by ASEAN’s 
militaries in line with those of other militaries (see below). For the time being, however, this 
is not the case and neither the AU nor ASEAN are investigated further in this article. 
 
Theoretical frames for understanding climate security  
Perhaps the single most important thing to understand about climate security is that it does 
not refer to one concept; instead proponents and critics have different and often competing 
ideas on the source of the threat, on who is to be defended and on who is the most appropriate 
provider of security.18 For this reason, I have suggested in a previous publication that climate 
security is better cast as a debate as opposed to a concept.19 Although policy-makers are 
unlikely to know the intricacies of academic debates– and indeed crossover between 
definitions is possible- for the purposes of analytical clarity it is useful to briefly consider the 
relevant literature and to separate out distinct meanings of climate security. At least three 
competing frames or discourses of climate security can be drawn out. 
 
Climate change as a source of violent conflict  
The first frame centres on the linkage of climate change and violent conflict. In 
Environmental Security Studies (ESS) environmental conflict has a long tradition and 
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competing theories on what precisely leads to conflict exist.20 Most prominently perhaps 
environmental scarcity theorists, argue that scarcity of renewable resources, when coupled 
with social effects has the potential to lead to violent conflict.21 Climate change ‘increases the 
scarcity of the regular patterns of rainfall and temperature on which farmers rely.’22 In the 
policymaking world the climate-conflict linkage has had a lot of purchase. One reason for 
this is the issue of “climate refugees”, which is to say persons displaced by climate induced 
change. Large numbers of “climate refugees” are expected to exacerbate local grievances, or 
in other words, social effects, triggering violent conflict.23  
 The linkage between climate and conflict has meant that a lot of emphasis is placed 
on early warning, conflict prevention and so-called environmental peacebuilding, the latter is 
the theory (and practice) that shared environmental problems can lead to cooperation even 
between enemies.24 A striking finding from within ESS is that media-hyped water wars are 
less likely than inter-state cooperation on water issues. An example often given are the so-
called ‘picnic table’ talks in 1957 between Jordan and Israel managing the shared Jordan 
River even though the two countries were technically at war.25  
 The referent object in the climate conflict nexus is traditionally the state, though of 
late conflict has found its way into human security research, with scholars acknowledging 
that conflict is an important source of deprivation and insecurity.26 
 
Climate change as a threat to national security  
 
The second frame of environmental/climate security centres on the role of the military in 
climate security. This thinking dates back to the end of the Cold War. In the US the Clinton 
administrations elevated environmental degradation to a threat to national security, and the 
Department of Defense (DOD) soon established itself as the largest and most important 
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environmental security actor domestically and internationally. Domestically it focused on 
cleaning up a huge Cold War environmental toxic legacy in order to ensure compliance with 
new legislation and also continued military readiness. Internationally, the focus was with 
assisting other countries to clean-up their environmental legacy, notably in Russia, where the 
US enabled nuclear waste stored in decommissioned nuclear sub-marines in the Murmansk 
area to be made safe. Such environmental cooperation was also considered a vehicle for 
peace and trust building between the former enemies, and formed part of Defense Secretary 
Perry’s wider strategy of ‘preventative defense’.27  
 The view of climate security by many of the world’s militaries today is similar to this. 
Climate change is considered a security issue not only because its ‘projected impacts […] 
will likely serve as catalysts for conflict’28, but also because rising sea-levels and extreme 
weather events threaten military bases, potentially leaving the military unable to adequately 
provide national security.29 Climate change, in short is considered a ‘threat multiplier’.30 One 
such threat is the increased frequency and vehemence of natural disasters; and defence 
academics and the military increasingly promote the role of the military in environmental 
disaster alleviation. 
 
Climate change as a threat to the individual  
The third frame of climate security is much broader than the other two and traditionally does 
not emphasise the climate-conflict-nexus. Instead, climate change is believed to have such 
serious negative consequences for human security that its destructiveness is comparable to 
that of war, and therefore should be treated equally seriously.31 Human security is commonly 
defined as ‘first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And 
second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily 
lives.’32  In this framing of climate security, the threat stems from the dangers of 
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environmental degradation caused by climate change including crop failure, the rise and 
spread of dangerous pathogens, food insecurity, adverse weather conditions  all of which are 
non-violent in character. Of late, however, conflict has become a concern for proponents of 
human security in particular because empirical evidence suggests that conflict damages 
infrastructure and institutions vital for adaptation to climate change.33  Proponents of climate 
security as human security argue that because climate change does not respect territorial 
boundaries, true climate security as a state of being34 can only be achieved if the issue is 
moved away from the traditional state-centric threat and defence nexus. This is not to suggest 
that states can’t be instrumental in the delivery of climate security, indeed the preferred 
vehicle for its achievement is a new binding global carbon regime.  
 
Politicisation or securitisation? 
Although human security emerged in the policy-making world and much of the UN’s work is 
informed by it, solutions to climate security as human security acutely raise the question of 
when is an issue ‘securitised’ as opposed to simply politicised?35 One accepted definition of 
evidence of securitisation clearly depends on who securitises– an issue is considered 
securitised if it is treated as such by a state’s pivotal security institutions, i.e. the military 
and/or the police.36 While this limits securitisation to certain type of actors, another definition 
holds that evidence of successful securitisation requires the adoption of extraordinary 
measures to deal with a threat37, or in other words with a specific type of action. Proponents 
of climate security as human security tend to challenge this latter notion of securitisation.38 
Although many such proponents would presumably like to see exceptional measures (e.g. 
legislation banning industry and personal transport, or a carbon regime policed and enforced 
by the UN Security Council) policy-makers sharing this definition tend to promote non-
exceptional measures- i.e. a standard global environmental regime to combat the climate 
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threat. The objections of traditionally minded observers (as regards security) that the latter is 
not securitisation39 can be countered with the suggestion that if –as many non-traditional 
security scholars hold– securitisation is a social construction40 and thus ‘what actors make of 
it’, then what is and is not securitisation is down to the practitioner of security and not to the 
observer.41 In other words, observers are in no position to argue that the action taken with 
reference to the securitising move (i.e. the rhetorical identification of climate change as an 
existential threat) must take a specific form (i.e. be exceptional); what matters instead is that 
following the rhetorical acknowledgement of threats, securitising agents act/change their 
behaviour and also that the action taken is justified with reference to the threat they 
themselves identified as part of the securitising move.42  
 
The case for climate security as human security  
The preceding discussion serves to highlight that participants of the climate security debate 
disagree –among other things- on who should be secured and from what precisely. We have 
seen that referent objects of security include nation-states, military readiness and human 
beings, while the interpretation of threat includes everything from war to non-violent long 
term environmental degradation triggered by climate change. Given that the aim of this 
article is the problematisation of the securitisation of climate change through a focus on 
global governance it remains to briefly discuss the moral value of the policy agendas 
supported by each frame of climate security. With a view to environmental security, I have 
done this in the final chapter of my 2010 book Security and the Environment, and I will draw 
on this work in this section.  Almost all moral theories identify objective human well-being as 
the most fundamental unit of value. In other words the value of things depends on whether or 
not they serve human well-being. That a functioning healthy natural environment and human 
well-being are interdependent, and the former therefore valuable, has been extensively 
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recorded by the Millennium Ecosystem Services assessment that identifies four distinct eco-
system services all of which foster human well-being in multiple ways.43 Given that not all 
frames of climate security identify human begins or ecosystem services as referent objects of 
security, we can say that not all corresponding climate security policies are morally right 
processes. I concede that while national environmental/climate security policy has the 
potential to increase the well-being of those people living within these states (including by 
averting potential violent environmental conflict and/or by having a green military) such a 
policy agenda fails to recognise the transnational nature of environmental issues notably 
climate change and is therefore not a long-term solution. Moreover the achievement of 
environmental/climate security at state level can often only be achieved at the expense of 
people elsewhere, including by securing scare resources from abroad (if necessary by force), 
by keeping unwanted “climate refugees” out and by maintaining a military along with its 
often sizable –and from a climate conscious standpoint problematic- ‘carbon boot-print’. 
Accordingly, only environmental/climate security as human security avoids these pitfalls 
because it ‘[…] stresses the fundamental interdependence between well-being and a healthy 
environment. [Rendering it] a morally right process, on account of its being the only policy 
agenda properly conducive to human well-being.’44  
 
The fragmented nature of global climate security governance      
In this section I aim to match up the distinct security organisations/actors with the different 
frames of climate security. For ease of navigation I will address each actor in turn. 
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The UN  
The size and nature of the UN as a global actor means that it is at the heart of a global 
governance approach to climate security. Yet the UN is hardly a unitary actor; it encompasses 
–among others- the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
the UN Security Council (UNSC) as well as a number of separate bodies such as the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Environment Programme (UNEP) all of 
which have a view on/are active in the area of climate security. The notable difference 
between these is that whereas the policies of the first two are negotiated by their member 
states, the latter possess clear operational mandates in line with general UN policy. This is 
important, because wherever member states dominate policy action we encounter a myriad of 
views on the meaning of, and necessary action to combat, climate change. Consequently 
within the UNSC debates on the subject in 2007 all three of the climate security frames were 
present and no consensus could be reached, while the UNFCCC negotiations are notoriously 
protracted processes. This said, however, it is also the case that the UN as a whole is 
informed by the UN Charter. Article 1 describes the role of the UN as founded on the 
promotion of peace and security and solving humanitarian issues. This means that all of the 
UN’s work is underpinned by the idea of the equality of human beings and the desire to 
enhance well-being; taken together these are a testimony to its humanitarian character. The 
UN like other humanitarian organisations (e.g. Oxfam and the Red Cross) is concerned with 
climate change primarily because of the manifold threats it poses to individuals, especially 
vulnerable communities within states that lack strong capacity to address threats to human 
security. The general assumption is that inhabitants of less and least developed countries will 
be the hardest hit by climate change. Not only are they geographically placed in already 
warm and dry regions of the south where the effects of climate change will be (or are being) 
felt most intensely, but these states also do not have the resources needed to adapt to climate 
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change. That the UN as a whole is clearly informed by climate security as human security is 
nowhere more obvious than in the UN General Assembly’s resolution A/63/281 on Climate 
Change and its possible security implications (adopted June 2009), which places heavy 
emphasis on sustainable development and invites all UN bodies to integrate climate change 
into their respective mandates.45 More recently the UN reiterated its commitment to climate 
security as human security in its 2013 report outlining a New Global Partnership: Eradicate 
Poverty and Transform economies through sustainable development. And we can find 
evidence of this commitment to climate security as human security even within the UNSC. A 
presidential statement released after a second debate in 2011 tried to collect the disparaging 
views of its participants into one document; telling is that it repeatedly stresses the need for 
sustainable development to combat climate change and the security implications of climate 
change for individuals. 
 Within UNEP and UNDP the commitment to climate security as human security is 
indisputable. UNEP has been active in raising awareness of the consequences of climate 
change understood along these lines. The programme is active in many environmental 
disaster areas and it operates in the area of conflict prevention, and environmental 
peacebuilding. Some of this work is done through the Disaster and Conflicts Programme 
which ‘seeks to minimize environmental threats to human well-being from the environmental 
causes and consequences of conflicts and disasters.’46 UNEP is also a partner to the multi-
agent Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), which focuses on ‘transforming risks 
into cooperation’, or in other words on environmental peacebuilding.47 UNDP and United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe also are partners to ENVSEC. 
 Perhaps the most important agency in UN climate security is the conference of the 
parties (COP) as the highest decision-making body of the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) which aims to bring about a post-Kyoto carbon emissions reduction 
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regime. If securitisation is defined permissively as ‘what actors make of it’, it means that 
even if such a regime does not include extraordinary enforcement mechanisms and/or 
necessitates extraordinary new laws in signatory countries to ensure compliance, its creation 
would still equate to securitisation, provided the UN continues to rhetorically link climate 
change and security in the way it does now. Although progress towards such a regime is 
tediously slow and frustrating the UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar 
(COP18/CMP8) in December 2012 had as one of its celebrated outcomes the decision to 
agree on a climate change regime in 2015, while it has also extended the Kyoto framework. 
The 2013 conference in Warsaw, in turn, made progress on emissions-cuts from 
deforestation. The 2014 conference in Lima negotiated a plan that, for the first time, commits 
all countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions and keeps governments on track towards a 
2015 universal agreement. 
 
NATO 
 
NATO has been interested in the linkage between environment and security since 1969, when 
it established the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) ‘as a unique 
forum for co-operation on issues inter alia trans-boundary environmental protection and 
environmental problems in general.’48 This programme was stepped up in importance with 
the ending of the Cold War and the securitisation of the environment in the US. In 1995 
CCMS commissioned a pilot study Environment & Security in an International Context. 
Although this study focused heavily on the possibility of violent environmental conflict, the 
latter remained a largely academic pursuit, and the alliance’s actual environmental security 
policy focused mainly on defence-related environmental issues and environmental peace-
building. For example, the Russian CCMS mission focused on the safe storage of spent 
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nuclear fuel retrieved from Russia’s decommissioned fleet of nuclear submarines. 
Cooperation with the Russians was also seen as a forum for peace-building between former 
enemies.49 As part of the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, such clean-up 
partnerships continue to this day. In 2013 NATO made available €620.000 towards 
recovering radioactive material and restoring the landscape in Vakulenchuk, Ukraine.50 
However, such clean-up operations are ultimately tied to strategic concerns (i.e. radioactive 
material falling into the wrong hands), this much is clear from the fact that no comparable 
plan for post-war environmental clean-up and restoration exists in Afghanistan, that while 
having suffered war’s usual environmental contamination and destruction does not have a 
nuclear legacy.  
 Today NATO’s primary concern as regards environmental and climate security is the 
adverse impact of environmental factors on military readiness and their ability to provide 
national and international security. In October 2009, the SPS established the Defence and 
Environment Experts Group (DEEG). One of the key projects run under this initiative looks 
at the ‘effects of environmental conditions on soldiers’ and focuses on securing soldiers from 
‘potential exposure to toxic industrial chemicals; biological and radiological substances; 
climatic and meteorological conditions; and the actions of belligerents with their own 
agenda.’51 Another project ‘sustainable operational military compounds’ looks at the carbon 
footprint of the military and aims to explore ‘the economical and tactical benefits of reducing 
the consumption and waste footprint of military compounds’.52 In large part, however, the 
latter is driven by concerns over energy supply for military operations, as opposed to a 
concern with green issues. Energy security is crucial to NATO’s overall environmental 
security strategy, because ‘environmental factors can affect energy supplies to both 
populations and military operations, making energy security a major topic for concern.’53 
Indeed, NATO’s fervent interest in an Artic altered by climate change can be explained in 
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terms of energy security, with some analysts claiming that ‘up to 13 percent of the world’s 
undiscovered oil reserves and almost one-third of the world’s undiscovered natural gas 
reserves are located in the Arctic region’.54 
  As a military organisation NATO also has an almost “natural” interest in the 
possibility of (climate induced) conflict. Alongside other regional actors it is also a partner to 
ENVSEC.  To-date NATO has lead or has joint-lead on 34 ENVSEC projects, many of which 
concerned water safety and quality in Central Asia and the Caucasus and on fostering 
dialogue between parties to a conflict.55  
 Lastly NATO is heavily involved in coordinating civil emergency planning which 
increasingly includes responses to environmental disasters. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster 
Response Coordination Centre (EARDCC) was launched following the earthquakes in 
Turkey and Greece in the late 1990s.56 Over the past few years EARDCC has provided 
disaster responses to assist, for example, with snow storms in 2012 in Albania and 
Montenegro, an earthquake in Turkey and floods in Pakistan, both in 2011.57 
 
OSCE 
 
The OSCE is with 57 member states in Europe, Central Asia and North-America the world’s 
largest (trans-) regional security organisation. The OSCE is ‘a forum for political negotiations 
and decision-making in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management 
and post-conflict rehabilitation’.58 Environmental change entered the organisation’s security 
agenda comparatively early. Already in 2003 its Maastricht Strategy called upon the Office of 
the OSCE Co-coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) to work in 
the area of early warning and conflict prevention with regards to environmental conflict.59 
Tellingly conflict prevention and environmental peace-building inform many of the 56 
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separate ENVSEC projects led or jointly led by the organisation.60 The OSCE’s Madrid 
Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Security in 2007 formerly recognised the 
potential linkage between climate change and conflict and reaffirmed the OSCE’s role in 
conflict prevention, regardless of conflict’s origin.61 The risk of climate induced conflict in 
the OSCE region is considered particularly high because the region suffers ‘from a 
prevalence of national and regional power struggles; ideological, ethnic, religious, and 
national tensions; and severe economic, social, or political inequality’ all of which are 
‘immediate drivers of conflict’62 that would become all the more acute with climate change.  
In short the fear is that an already volatile region will become even more unstable as a result 
of climate change, while the OSCE lacking any military capabilities would be unable to deal 
with these.  
 For the purposes of this article it is interesting that the document also recognised 
climate change as a ‘long-term challenge’ and acknowledged that ‘the United Nations climate 
process is the appropriate forum for negotiating future global action on climate change, and 
the OSCE, as a regional security organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, has a 
complementary role to play within its mandate in addressing this challenge in its specific 
region’.63 Whilst climate-conflict prevention is now part of the OSCE’s general missions, it is 
important to realise that because the OSCE is not cemented by a legally binding agreement it 
has virtually no power to enforce anything and instead relies on the political will of 
individual member states. In short the OSCE is the weakest institution within the wider 
global security architecture with no real political power to enforce desired behaviour in 
member states. Nonetheless the willingness of OSCE countries to participate in 
environmental missions is quite high and -among other things- the OSCE has facilitated 
cross-border environmental cooperation ahead of a mining project based in Kyrgyzstan 
destined to adversely affect (because of its position near the border) water quality in 
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Kazakhstan. It has facilitated water-cooperation between Moldova and Ukraine in the trans-
boundary Dniester/Nistru river basin that is an important source of drinking water, fishing, 
recreation and hydro-electricity. And it has set up so-called “Aarhus centres” across the 
participating States in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, which serve as 
meeting places and environmental information dissemination platforms for NGOS, state 
officials and the public.64  
 
The EU 
 
The European Security Strategy from December 2003 mentions global warming only in 
passing and it was not until the so-called Solana Report on Climate Change and International 
Security (2008), written by the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy 
for presentation to the European Council, that climate security had fully arrived on the EU’s 
institutional radar. This report highlights in particular the possibility of climate conflict, 
economic loss, loss of territory and border disputes, thus by and large traditional security 
concerns.65 Considering that Solana was formerly NATO’s Secretary General this is perhaps 
not surprising; he would have been especially concerned about the lack of military capability 
in the EU and indeed it was under his leadership that plans for a 50 to 60,000-strong rapid 
reaction military force were first hatched.  A Report on the Implementation of the European 
Security Strategy-Providing Security in a Changing World from later that same year, stresses 
some of the same points but hints at a more concrete climate security strategy by emphasising 
the element of cooperation.66  
 Today the EU’s thinking on the connection between climate change and security 
continues to centre on traditional security concerns including the possibility of climate-
induced conflict; if now under the remit of the EU’s wider climate diplomacy policy. A joint 
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reflection article by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the services of the 
Commission argues that climate change ‘acts as a “threat multiplier” exacerbating tensions 
over land, water, food, and energy prices, thus creating migratory pressures. It serves as a 
potential catalyst for conflict’.67 Considering that the EU, in particular at its southern borders, 
is already under severe pressure from immigration it is hardly surprising that the EU should 
be concerned with the possibility of climate-induced migration. Furthermore, despite the 
EU’s emphasis on common security and defence the conflict in Libya in 2011, and more 
recently the Ukrainian crisis, have demonstrated once again that the EU stands helpless in the 
face of overt violent conflict in the European Neighbourhood and areas bordering/near it. 
Consequently the EU, as a security actor with limited or no military capabilities, is concerned 
with conflict prevention. Interestingly, however, they recognise that climate insecurity is best 
addressed as part of wider climate action. ‘[A]t the heart of a successful response is the need 
to transition to a low carbon sustainable economy and society […].’68 It should be noted that 
the EU itself is committed to a 20% cut below 1990s levels, and to an 80–95% cut compared 
to 1990 levels by 2050.69 To achieve this, the EU is stepping up its climate diplomacy. One 
strand of climate diplomacy focuses on convincing other countries, ‘that a robust and 
ambitious international framework is in their interests and that, their emissions reduction 
actions need to be implemented and reinforced.70 Another focuses on communicating the 
inter-linkage between climate change and security in order to ‘raise global awareness of the 
security risks, and threat-multiplier nature, of climate change, particularly in vulnerable 
regions.’71 More recently the Foreign Affairs Council meeting at the Council of Europe 
reaffirmed the EU’s climate diplomacy policy stressing the importance of the 2015 as the 
deadline for the signing of a new global carbon emissions reduction regime.72 Nevertheless in 
concrete situations the EU’s use of soft power to drive forward a binding climate regime has 
in the past been severely hampered by low degrees of both ‘preference cohesion’ and 
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‘procedural-tactical cohesion’.73 Lisanne Groen and Arne Niemann have shown how during 
the UN 2009 climate conference in Copenhagen both the EU’s ‘actorness’ and ‘effectiveness’ 
were hampered by disagreement concerning the EU’s emissions reduction goals, whilst they 
also seemed unable to easily overcome ‘diverging preferences and solve disagreements’74, 
with some member states (i.e. Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic) openly blocking progress on 
the formulation of a common EU position before and during the conference. In other words, 
despite seemingly good intentions towards reducing climate emissions and providing climate 
security the EU remains a divided and often weak actor. 
 
 
The US 
 
Although climate change featured in the 2010 US National Security Strategy (NSS), the US 
is far behind, for example, the EU when it comes to concrete policies concerning GHG 
reduction. Infamously the US did not ratify the Kyoto protocol in 2001 and instead launched 
a number of multi-lateral regimes -including the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development established in 2005 and the Major Economies Process on Energy Security and 
Climate Change established in 2007- that conflict with the UNFCCC.75 Domestically 
important legislation governing carbon emissions that might trigger the US to take up global 
leadership on climate action has not succeeded. Notably the Clean Energy and Security Act 
of 2009 was defeated by the House of Representatives in July 2010. The earlier Climate 
Security Act of 2007 suffered the same fate with Senate Republicans worried it would 
damage the economy. In June 2013 Obama introduced his latest climate action plan. While it 
is not strictly necessary that the actual word ‘security’ is used to signify security policy- more 
important is the logic of existential threats, specifying points of no return-76 it is interesting 
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that Obama’s Georgetown University speech from the 23rd of June 2013 did not evoke this 
logic (especially considering that his Berlin speech from the 19th of the same month did just 
that). Instead climate change was framed as a public health issue and an economic issue, 
insofar as natural disasters have cost the economy more than $110 billion in 2012.77 Finally 
the speech stressed that reducing carbon emissions and moving towards a greener society 
would reduce dependence on foreign oil, otherwise called energy security.78 The plan 
reiterated Obama’s conditional pledge ‘to cut emissions by 2020, [and that] America would 
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions in the range of 17% below 2005 levels if all other major 
economies agreed to limit their emissions as well.’79 A target that amounts to ‘only a 4% cut 
in emissions compared with 1990 levels’.80 Obama’s plan, however, does include the 
administration’s boldest move so far. In an effort to avoid Republican dominated Congress, 
Obama issued an executive memo to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), enabling 
them to introduce new rules concerning emissions from power plants. The focus on the EPA 
also explains why there is such a heavy focus on public health in the speech and 
accompanying plan. The new rules came into force on the 2nd of June 2014, but because 
states have until 2020 to implement these rules it is impossible to predict what the outcome of 
these plans is going to be at this stage (especially considering that there is a lot of opposition 
from coal-burning states). For certain is, however, that climate change is now firmly on the 
rhetorical agenda of the Obama administration.  
 
US Department of Defense  
The US based Center for Climate & Security has compiled a list of those administration 
officials who have linked climate change to security and how they have done so.81 Most 
noticeable is that the list includes an overwhelming number of DOD officials including three 
former and current Secretaries of Defence: Leon Panetta, Robert Gates and Chuck Hagel. 
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Indeed the Pentagon’s interest in climate security is longstanding. At the height of the war on 
terror and very much against the ideological beliefs of the Bush administration, the 
Pentagon’s long-range planning office headed by Andrew Marshall commissioned risk 
analyst scenario writers Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall to examine whether climate 
change may pose a threat to US security. Their scenario postulated dramatic security 
implications including endemic ‘disruption and conflict’ from abrupt climate change.82 In the 
Bush years this report caused controversy between the White House and the DOD, and the 
former forced the removal of the item from the Pentagon’s website. In 2007 when eleven 
retired US Army and Navy generals and Admirals lead by former Deputy Undersecretary of 
Defense for Environmental Security Sherri Goodman, published a report on climate security, 
the attitude towards the environment on part of the Bush administration had shifted, at least in 
so far as they had realised that continuous denial of the anthropocentric causes of climate 
change was out of touch with the American population.83 Coupled with the facts that 
participants on the CNA’s Military Advisory Board enjoy a certain amount of gravitas and 
that many have Republican leanings84, this might explain why –unlike with the Schwartz and 
Randall report- there was no open hostility on part of the White House towards the CNA 
Corporation’s report. In any case the CNA report is ground-breaking only when considered in 
the context of the anti-green ideology sported by the Bush administrations. Although it does 
call on the US to set targets for greenhouse gas emissions, not only are no targets specified, 
but also there is much concern about the resilience of the DOD to climate change. For 
example, the report argues that ‘The Department of Defense should conduct an assessment of 
the impact on US military security installations worldwide of rising sea-levels, extreme 
weather events, and other projected climate change impacts over the next 30 to 40 years.’85 
And it calls for a ‘global partnership’ on capacity and resiliency building in developing 
countries, led amongst others by regional commanders.86 The updated second CNA report 
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from May 2014 highlights the operational risk climate change poses to the military: ‘impacts 
include increased risk to life and safety, injury, and a degrading effect on mission 
performance. In war and other critical operations, commanders are forced to take larger risks 
during extreme weather because of the mission, although often with less than ideal results.’87  
 Today the Pentagon is the US government body that takes climate security most 
seriously.  Like other militaries (notably NATO) their interpretation of the meaning of 
climate security focuses on the impact of climate change on their own ability to provide 
national security. The DOD’s Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap (CCAR) from 2012, 
born out of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), is the clearest statement on 
DOD’s thinking on the issue so far. It states that climate change will affect the DOD in two 
main ways. First, it will reshape the military’s ‘operating environment, roles, and missions’, 
to include the possibility of climate induced violent conflict.88 For the time being, the DOD is 
still involved in gathering evidence and raising awareness. Its Minerva initiative, for 
example, sponsors University-based social science research on climate induced conflict, with 
a heavy focus on Africa.89  
 Climate change is also expected to increase the number and frequency DOD’s disaster 
relief and humanitarian missions. Although not climate induced a recent example is the US 
military’s response to the Earthquake in Haiti in 2010. Operation Unified Response involved 
‘more than 22,000 U.S. troops, 30 ships and 300 aircraft supported the international effort 
to save lives, deliver/distribute millions of pounds of food and water, restore vital 
infrastructure and assist long-term recovery efforts.’90 
 Second, the ‘DOD will need to adjust to the impacts of climate change on its 
facilities, infrastructure, training and testing activities, and military capabilities. The DOD’s 
operational readiness hinges on continued access to land, air, and sea training and test space, 
all of which are subject to the effects of climate change.’91 The concern for the safety of 
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military installations is especially acute among Navy commanders of low-lying bases 
susceptible to sea-level rise.92 The DOD is also sponsoring research into how dust, forest 
fires and drought could affect bases in the American Mid-West.93  
 In addition, the Pentagon is worried about its own energy usage, largely because of 
the US’s dependence on foreign oil, but there is also the realisation that climate change can 
potentially have a negative impact on energy provision.94 In 2009 Congress authorised the 
creation of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and 
Programs through the Defence Authorization Act. This Office monitors –for the first time– 
the DOD’s energy use and seeks to reduce energy usage for military operations, which 
accounted for 75% of its overall energy use in 2009. In 2010 the estimate was that the DOD 
consumed more than 5 billion gallons of fuel in operations.95 To ensure energy sufficiency 
the DOD is not only monitoring its usage; but it has also begun to experiment with 
alternative, though as I’ll shortly show, not necessarily green fuels. 
 
Problems stemming from fragmentation  
This article is concerned with the consequences of fragmented global climate security 
governance. It was argued that fragmentation is in the first instance institutional with a 
number of different actors/organisations taking charge of the provision of climate security. 
The analysis suggests institutional fragmentation per se is not a problematic development, 
because (trans-) regional security actors can in principle share the UN’s preference for 
climate security as human security, which –as argued- is to be regarded as the morally 
appropriate framing of the issue, on account of it supporting a morally right policy agenda. 
The case of the OSCE demonstrates that even climate-conflict thinking need not be at odds 
with the UN’s agenda provided that the (trans-)regional organisation’s objectives are seen as 
complementary to that of the UN (indeed this is true for the work of ENVSEC as a whole).96  
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The case of the EU further supports this claim, at least insofar as for the EU climate conflict 
is part of a wider climate diplomacy that aims at GHG reduction.  
 While institutional fragmentation is not necessarily problematic it leads to ideational 
fragmentation, which –at least in the case of climate security– is problematic. Thus informed 
by their institutional identity distinct security organisations/actors are likely to have different 
ideas about the nature of the threat, the referent object, and the provider of climate security, 
ideas that are often far removed from those of the UN and their preference for climate 
security as human security, that promises to stabilise the climate for people. Ideational 
fragmentation captures the phenomenon that diverse organisations/actors choice of discourse 
on any given issue is influenced by who they are, specifically by their relative strengths (i.e. 
what they can (uniquely) offer and do about the issue) and their (perceived) weaknesses (i.e. 
how precisely does the issue affect them, or even in what sense does the issue render them 
insecure). The analysis shows that in matters of security (perceived) weaknesses are likely to 
play the decisive role in the framing of the issue as most security actors/organisations are 
concerned with a threat because of what it means for them and their ability to ensure/provide 
security. In the case of global climate security governance we can readily see this. Thus the 
main reason why the EU prioritises the climate-conflict angle and not the human security 
angle favoured by the UN is that, as an organisation with no or limited military capabilities, it 
has repeatedly proved weak in situations of conflict in Europe and elsewhere.97 Yet, the EU 
would do well to be more critical of the climate-conflict-nexus. Not only is climate change as 
human security more in line with the EU’s much written about respect for human rights, but 
also the EU should be mindful that the ‘us versus them’ logic informing much climate 
conflict thinking is potentially harmful to developing states most vulnerable to climate 
change.98 Moreover there is still uncertainly on the positive correlation between climate 
change and conflict.99 If no direct causal linkage between climate and conflict can be 
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established the EU’s aspiration for leadership on global climate action will be weakened. Its 
leadership potential is already subject to its own performance on these issues (particularly 
whether it can meet Kyoto targets only through off-setting), and by its ability to speak as a 
unitary actor.100 In climate negotiations gone by, its decision-making structure (which 
demands unanimity of all members’ states in setting emission reduction targets) has ensured 
problematic orientation towards the lowest common denominator.101   
 The analysis further shows that military organisations are interested in climate change 
primarily because of what climate change means for them. Although, as in the case of 
disaster relief, the military can play an important supplementary role in climate security 
provision, the DOD’s interpretation of the issue is ultimately self-serving (the same is true for 
much of NATO’s effort), and it serves to showcase not only the dangers of the world’s 
militaries assuming leadership on climate security as the DOD has done in the US102, but also 
the disadvantages of fragmentation. Thus the DOD’s and NATO’s focus is on military 
readiness and the safety of military installations from climate change, and not with making 
the climate safe for people. In other words, the referent object of the DOD’s and NATO’s 
climate security strategies differs with their concentration on military readiness strongly from 
that of the UN. Given that the military cannot defend us against the causes of climatic change 
this is a problematic development.103 Indeed the U.S. military with its huge ‘carbon 
bootprint’ is one of the largest single emitters of GHG worldwide104, and a genuine greening 
of defense would make a difference to GHG. The problem is, however, that its nominal 
attempts towards investing into alternative fuels are not driven by an interest in climate 
action, but instead by a concern with energy insecurity and over-dependence on foreign oil. 
While there might be a realisation that climate/environmental change can adversely affect 
energy security, for example, extreme weather events can disrupt critical energy 
infrastructure105, ‘energy security for the DOD means having assured access to reliable 
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supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational 
needs.’106 As Briggs correctly stresses, this is not ‘a green view of the world’.107 Thus, in the 
past the DOD has advocated petroleum production from oil shale as a ‘clean fuel’.108 And 
while its own tentative plans to develop such fuels on a massive scale were undermined by 
Section 526 of the 2007 Energy Act, which prohibits US federal agencies from purchasing 
fuels derived from unconventional crude that produces higher GHGs than conventional oil, it 
has lobbied for the loosening of this law by downplaying the environmental impact of such 
fuels. The issue now has bi-partisan support and that of American Fuel & Petrochemical 
Manufacturers (AFPM). On June 6th 2013 Senators Manchin (Democrat, West Virginia) and 
Barrasso (Republican, Wyoming) introduced to Congress the North American Alternative 
Fuels Act which aims to repeal section 526 of the 2007 Energy Act, allowing the DOD to 
purchase fuel produced from Canadian oil sands. Since the Obama administration has no 
concrete plans to clamp down on petroleum production from tar sands109 this is set to go 
through. Indeed, if the history of environmental security within the DOD is anything to go on, 
any policies and laws that actually clamp down on the military’s “carbon bootprint” and 
enforce better environmental stewardship, are destined to be branded ‘threats to military 
readiness, and thus national security’ as soon as a new danger arises that requires massive 
military mobilisation. Thus, during the war on terror under the Bush administrations, 
environmental stewardship laws and regulations inherited from the Clinton administrations 
were branded a threat to military readiness and consequently national security.110  
  
 
Conclusion   
This article has focused on the fragmented nature of global climate security governance, in 
order to problematise the securitisation of climate change. The analysis demonstrates that in 
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the specific case of climate security fragmentation is highly disadvantageous, because it does 
not equate to an increase in actual security for people. This is not primarily a function of 
institutional fragmentation, indeed the case of the OSCE and to a lesser extent that of the EU 
suggest there is no categorical reason why a myriad of security organisations/actors cannot 
work towards a wider global agenda set by the UN, whose climate security as human security 
approach promises a safe climate for people. This said, however, institutional fragmentation 
also facilitates ideational fragmentation. Ideational fragmentation recognises that discourses 
are tied to institutional identity. Thus this article has shown that in matters of security 
especially a security actor’s (perceived) weaknesses shapes the frames/discourses they will 
adopt, leaving them to hold often conflicting views on the meaning of climate security and on 
the best policy action. The emerging gap in priorities together with widely different 
interpretations of the meaning of climate security is likely to further cement institutional 
fragmentation, ultimately suggesting that there is little escape from ideational fragmentation 
and the problems it brings with it. 
 The question therefore arises: can ideational fragmentation as regards climate security 
be overcome? Given that ideational fragmentation is facilitated by the definitional lacuna of 
climate security the first step would have to be the advancement of a universal definition by 
an authoritative source. The appropriate actor here is the IPCC and it is an auspicious 
development that the latest report by Working Group II includes a chapter on human 
security.111 The second step would have to be genuine and widespread acceptance of that 
definition together with the necessary changes to the respective security actor’s climate 
security policy/strategy. The latter is unlikely to happen. From critical/non-traditional 
security studies we know that security is a matter of perception. In that sense the world’s 
militaries are simply acting in line with their mandate when they –under the label of climate 
security- concern themselves with the implication for soldiers’ health and safety, energy 
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security and by extension the ability to provide national security. They would not see the 
reason for changing their strategy112, and indeed it would be unreasonable to expect them to 
advance a climate security strategy that addresses the root causes of climate insecurity; they 
are simply not the organisation/actor best suited for this task. This leads me to conclude that 
ideational fragmentation on this issue will not be overcome and that we as scholars ought to 
remain sceptical of efforts to securitise climate change and do our best to advise practitioners 
accordingly.  
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